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Abstract
The Social Democratic Full Employment Model in the Nordic Countries underwent a rapid
transition in the 1980s and early 1990s. In this paper, change and continuity is examined
along three dimensions: the political stimulation of demand for labour, the political incen-
tives influencing labour supply, and thirdly, the politics targeted towards enhancing the
matching process on the labour market. In the first dimension it is shown that in all four
countries the consensual wage bargaining systems were eroded in the 1980s which implied
high wage increases and, as a consequence, shrinking employment. Despite the progress of
globalisation, this institutional erosion was the main cause of the Nordic employment crisis
in the early 1990s. In Denmark, Norway, and - not until the mid 1990s - Finland, the wage
bargaining systems could be remodelled, but not so in Sweden. It is shown that this differ-
ence was caused by the reluctance of Swedish governments to release the employers from
the financial burden of the welfare state. In the second dimension it is argued that the la-
bour force supply declined in all four countries. The end of the Nordic ‘Work Societies’ can
partly be explained by the strategic social policies of the various governments. In the third
section, it is shown that the Social Democratic Model remained stable: In all four countries,
active labour market policies are still at the centre of public attempts to improve the
matching process on the labour market. Hence, continuity and change are mixed in the
Nordic Full Employment Model. Taken together, this paper argues, that a restoration of the
Social Democratic Full Employment Model in a world of globalised financial markets is
based on a combination of moderate wage policies and a relieving of the employers of the
costs of the welfare state.
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51 Introduction
A theory of Social Democracy is, by and large, a theory of Scandinavia.1 At least in „terms
of the welfare state and full employment performance, the presence of a ‘social democratic
regime’ is limited to the Nordic nations“ (Esping-Andersen/van Kersbergen 1992: 202).
There, powerful social democratic parties and highly organised trade unions dominated the
political sphere, and in Cusack’s (1995) words, in these countries the „Center of Political
Gravity“ has been on the left since World War II. This hegemony of labour has been sup-
plemented by the co-ordinated policy process in these countries, and the Nordic Countries
have been classified as highly corporatistic (cf. Lijphart/Crepaz 1991; Pek-
karinen/Pohjola/Rowthorn 1992) or they approach the „Social Democratic Corporatist
Model“ (Hicks 1994). And indeed, until the late 1980s, the Nordic Countries had been „an
island of low unemployment in a sea of high European joblessness“ (Elmeskov 1994: 29).
In the early 1990s, open unemployment increased in all four countries. Between 1988 and
1994, unemployment in the OECD countries increased on average by 2 percentage points,
whereas unemployment went up in Finland by 13.7, in Sweden by 6.4, in Denmark by 5.6,
and in Norway by 2.2 percentage points. Obviously, the Nordic Full Employment Model
was no longer able to sustain full employment. The aim of this paper is to investigate the
political and economical causes which help to explain the transition of the Nordic Full Em-
ployment Model.
What are the cornerstones of the Social Democratic Full Employment Model? From a com-
parative point of view2, the Nordic Countries differed until the 1980s in three dimensions
from the rest of the OECD world. Firstly, the Nordic Countries shared one common goal:
their economic policy stance had been designed to promote demand for labour: Economic
and monetary policies were targeted towards full employment, not to defend price stability.
Furthermore, governments and central banks relied until the 1980s often on devaluations in
order to strengthen the national export industries, and they used their credit policies to pro-
mote investment. These policies were complemented by centralised and highly co-
ordinated wage bargaining systems. This corporatistic institutional framework has been
                                                  
1
‘Scandinavia’ or the term ‘Nordic Countries’ includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
Because of size, unique economic conditions, and data unavailability, Iceland is excluded from the
analysis.
2 Mjøset (1992: 654) is right when he argues that the „existence of a model can only be established
through comparative research“. Because of that, and to avoid Nordic „Ethnocentrism“ (Anckar
1993), the focus of this paper is strictly comparative. Despite the notion of a Nordic Model, it is not
intended to blur the differences between the Nordic Countries. However, the commonalties in the
mentioned dimensions prevail if we compare the Nordic „Family of Nations“ (Castles 1993) with
other OECD countries.
6made responsible for moderate wage developments and consensual labour relations (cf.
Kjellberg 1992; Pekkarinen /Pohjola/Rowthorn 1992). Additionally, with the welfare state
expansion, public employment had increased in all four countries, thereby compensating for
job losses in the private sector. Hence, in order to stimulate demand for labour a wide array
of policy instruments had been used in a framework of a highly interventionist state.
Secondly, in the Nordic Countries welfare policies are designed to promote an encompass-
ing inclusion of the population in the labour market, thereby maximising labour supply.
They are in a comparative perspective leaders in respect of female participation (Schmidt
1993a), the integration of the older workforce (Wadensjö 1994; Olofsson/Petersson 1994)
and even the integration of the younger workforce has been comparatively high - at least
until the late 1980s. Besides full-employment, the central policy goal has been to maximise
labour market integration - in contrast to most of the continental welfare states
(Aust/Bieling 1996: 145).
Thirdly, the Nordic Countries differ from other OECD countries in the emphasis which is
laid upon active labour market policies. All four countries spend huge amounts on active
labour market policies, and indeed this is the main characteristic of the „Scandinavian
model for labour market policy“ (Furåker/Johansson/Lind 1990: 141) or a „social demo-
cratic strategy“ of labour market policy (Janoski 1996: 698).
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Nordic Full Employment Model changed in several as-
pects, but what were the causes behind this transition? We can distinguish two lines of ar-
gument. The first makes globalisation and economic pressures responsible for the erosion
of the Nordic Model. The second points to the erosion of power resources, changing in-
cumbent parties and the changing role of labour market institutions. I argue that change and
continuity in the Nordic Model is best explained with a combination of these two argu-
ments, whereby the internal adaptation to changing international environments is of crucial
importance.
The paper proceeds in the following way: In the second chapter, a survey of the develop-
ments in the labour market is presented first. In this survey it is revealed that in the Nordic
Countries different developments occurred in the labour markets, which in turn makes it
necessary to breakdown the analysis. Hence, in the next step, the politics of stimulating
employment are analysed. The following step is devoted to the development of labour sup-
ply, whereas the last focuses on labour market policies. Chapter three concludes.
72 The Nordic Full Employment Model in Transition - A Disenta-
gled Analysis
What happened on the labour markets in Scandinavia? Figure 1 reveals the developments in
employment and labour force participation since 1960. Until 1987 or 1989, employment
increased in all four countries. Then, employment in Finland and Sweden collapsed,
whereas in Denmark and Norway the decline was rather modest, but from a comparative
point of view even there the decline was still above the OECD average. Labour force par-
ticipation followed quite different directions. The supply of labour has declined since the
late 1980s in Norway, Finland and very markedly in Sweden. In Denmark in contrast, la-
bour force participation remained - until 1994 - at a rather high level, falling modestly
thereafter.
Figure 1: Development of Labour Force Participation and Employment in Scandinavia,
1960 - 1995
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Sources: OECD 1994b, 1996a, Employment Outlook (various issues).
8As can be seen, the developments in the Nordic Countries differed in the early 1990s. Em-
ployment declined sharply in Finland and Sweden, modestly in Denmark and Norway. On
the supply side of the labour market, all countries except Denmark experienced declining
rates of labour market participation. These diverging trends did not only have an impact on
the amount of the rising unemployment.3 Furthermore, this result makes it necessary to
breakdown the analysis of the Nordic Full Employment Models and to examine the political
conditions for stimulating demand for labour, for influencing labour force supply and for
improving the matching process on the labour market step-by-step.
2.1 The Politics of Stimulating Employment
Employment dropped in all four countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And the de-
cline in employment has been from a comparative point of view exceptional in the Nordic
Countries.4 What are the political reasons for this development, or what are the circum-
stances that can explain this - in a historical perspective - unique decline in employment?
We can distinguish three hypothesis: Firstly, the economic crises in the early 1990s were so
severe that there was no leeway to counteract (Elmeskov 1994: 65; Therborn 1995: 125).
Secondly, globalisation has caused the sharp decline of employment in the Nordic Coun-
tries. Thirdly, internal developments induced the decline of employment, and here the role
of the wage bargaining systems and the funding system incentives of the welfare states have
to be considered.
Economic crises do not imply doom for employment development - this was one central
thesis of the comparative labour market research (Scharpf 1987; Schmidt 1982, 1987;
Therborn 1985). The Nordic Countries, however, underwent huge economic turmoil in the
early 1990s, and this - it is argued - was the reason for the breakdown of employment
(Elmeskov 1994: 65; Therborn 1995: 125). From a comparative point of view, this argu-
ment does not hold. In Sweden and Finland, economic growth deteriorated in the early
1990s, but this was not the case in Denmark where growth was in line with the OECD av-
erage, and in Norway, growth has been clearly above the OECD average throughout the
1980s and 1990s. The case of Norway, especially, demonstrates that the employment crisis
can not be explained by economic growth rates alone. On the other hand, the responsive-
                                                  
3 If we assume that the labour force participation since 1988 had been constant, the hypothetical un-
employment rate in 1994 would have risen in Finland by 5.8 percentage points, in Norway by 2.4,
and in Sweden by 4.9. In Denmark, on the contrary, open unemployment would have been 1.5 per-
centage points lower. This clarifies, how important it is to include the development of the labour
supply in studies on unemployment (cf. von Rhein-Kress 1996).
4 Between 1988 and 1994, the employment rate dropped in Finland by 13.4 percentage points, in
Sweden by 10.8, in Denmark by 5.6, and in Norway by 4.9. Hence, the Nordic Countries are the
laggards in the OECD area (there, on average, employment dropped by only 1.2 percentage points).
9ness of employment to varying growth rates increased in all four countries in the 1980s, if
compared with the 1970s. Then, employment was fairly de-coupled from economic growth,
whereas this was not the case in the 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, we can argue that eco-
nomic growth, even in the 1990s, is not directly linked to employment levels, but the re-
sponsiveness has clearly increased, which indicates that some political instruments may
have lost their relevance or power to counteract economic crisis.5
Globalisation is the new growth industry in the social sciences (cf. Busch 1996). However,
there is some confusion about what globalisation really is and what consequences this de-
velopment may imply for the labour market. In this paper the term globalisation covers two
dimensions: Firstly, the flows of investment are one part of the phenomena of globalisation.
Huge global players in Scandinavia - such as IKEA, Ericsson or Statoil - transcend national
borders which implies a drain of investments and as a consequence undermines domestic
employment and the foundations of the Social Democratic route to full employment (for
Sweden cf. Pontusson 1992a). Secondly, the constitution of the financial markets has
changed dramatically in recent years. The internationalisation of capital markets, it is ar-
gued, forces the convergence of interest rates, fiscal, monetary and currency policies- which
is enforced by European integration. To default from the main trend in these areas is imme-
diately punished by capital flight. This as a consequence diminishes the leeway for
‘Sonderwege’ to stabilise employment (cf. Scharpf 1987, 1996). Hence, we should observe
a convergence of macro-economic goals. Foremost among these is the convergence be-
tween the OECD states in favouring price stability as the main policy goal to mention. And
indeed, this policy change has been made responsible by several authors for the breakdown
of the Nordic Full Employment Model (cf. Calmfors 1993; Moses 1994; Notermans 1993,
1994). But this policy convergence includes currency policies as well. In a world of global-
ised capital, strategic devaluations in order to restore competitiveness should be punished
by the actors on the capital markets. Hence, we should assume that devaluations should no
longer be viable in a globalised economy.
All four Scandinavian Countries experienced - with respect to the above mentioned aspects
- a sharp increase in globalisation in the 1980s (cf. Swank 1997). Firstly, foreign direct in-
vestment outflows increased during the 1980s in all four countries, whereas the inflow re-
mained on a rather low level (for Sweden cf. Pontusson 1992a; Stråth 1993). However,
from a comparative point of view, high outflows of investment capital have not been unique
to the Nordic Countries. Even in the Netherlands or in Belgium, huge multinational firms
have used the leeway to invest abroad. And as can be seen in these countries, the outflow of
investment capital is no hindrance to raising employment. Hence, even this new develop-
ment in the Nordic Countries may not explain why these countries were hit by such exten-
                                                  
5 This argument relies heavily on analysis which are reported elsewhere. Because of limited space, I
refer to the main results only (cf. Jochem 1997: 137-141).
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sive employment crises. However, it poses the question, why employers invested abroad
and not in the domestic economy, a question which will be answered later on in this chap-
ter.
Secondly, all four countries changed their policy stance: the defence of price stability be-
came the main policy goal. In Norway and Denmark, this policy-shift had already occurred
in 1981 and 1982 under the newly elected bourgeois governments. The other Nordic gov-
ernments with a short delay followed suit. Notermans (1993, 1994) as well as Moses (1994)
and Calmfors (1993: 53) argue, that this is the main cause of the end of the Nordic Full
Employment Model, at least in Norway and Sweden. The fight against inflation has its price
in shrinking employment and rising unemployment. Not surprisingly, the relationship be-
tween the development of the consumer price index and the employment rate is negative for
the OECD countries between 1984 and 1994. And this argument holds relatively well for
Denmark and Finland. In Norway and Sweden, however, the development in the employ-
ment rate reveals no relationship to the development of the consumer price index.6 After
1989 employment increased slightly in Norway, despite further declining inflation rates.
And in Sweden, employment remained stable during the 1980s despite very huge variations
in the consumer price index. Hence, we can argue that in the Nordic Countries the fight
against inflation became the major policy goal in the 1980s. But this policy change can
hardly explain the dramatic decline of employment in these countries. It is rather a reduc-
tion in the leeway available for governments to counteract shrinking employment rates, but
not the cause of it.
Finally, the changing leeway in the currency policy may have induced the Scandinavian
employment crisis. Indeed, from this perspective, the greatest change in the Nordic Full
Employment Model occurred. The Scandinavian Countries had relied since World War II
on a macro economic strategy which included strategic devaluations in order to regain
competitiveness for domestic export industries (Gylfason 1990; Korkman 1992; for Swe-
den: Lindbeck et al. 1993: 252; Lindbeck 1997: 1308). Even in the early 1980s, the Danish
Social Democratic government could no longer use this policy instrument to the extent they
wished to. Instead of a devaluation of the krona by 7%, the partners in the European Union
accepted only a devaluation of 3% (Schaumann 1993: 249). In Sweden (1982), Finland
(1982 and 1986)7, and Norway (1986) such a strategy was still viable in the 1980s, but at
                                                  
6 The correlation between the consumer price index and the change of employment rates is for Den-
mark between 1984 and 1994: r = .54, for Finland: r = .55. In contrast, there is only a moderate cor-
relation in Norway: r = .34 and Sweden: r = .39 (cf. Jochem 1997: 145).
7 The Finish history provides various examples of such „devaluation cycles“: „When the profitability
of the exports sector weakens and the economy enters a recession, policies react in a contractive
fashion. Fiscal and monetary policy are tightened, the currency is devalued and wages are frozen in
order to restore profitability“ (Andersson/Kosonen/Vartiainen 1993:9). As a consequence, the Fin-
nish economy has been classified as highly volatile in the OECD area (Pekkarinen 1989: 326).
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the end of this decade even there, the currency policy became more restricted. In Sweden,
for example, the main trade union federation (LO) forcefully requested a major devaluation
at the end of the 1980s in order to restore profitability to the export industries. However, the
Carlsson Government rejected this claim: The stability of the currency had become a major
policy goal in Sweden at the end of the 1980s (Mjøset 1996: 23). This in fact diminished
the leeway for governments - and central banks - to counteract negative developments with
regard to competitiveness, which in turn have their origin in the way wages and supple-
mentary wage costs are regulated.
The third hypothesis refers to internal developments in the Nordic Full Employment Model.
And here the roots of the Scandinavian employment crisis are based: The erosion of the
hitherto consensual wage bargaining systems and the - partly - negative consequences of the
funding systems of the Nordic welfare state did cause the sharp decline of employment. The
Nordic wage bargaining systems were - at least until the 1980s - stylised by comparative
researchers as highly consensual and co-ordinated (cf. Layard/Nickel/Jackmann 1994;
Soskice 1990). But in the 1980s, the Nordic Model of labour relations (cf. Kjellberg 1992)
withered away.8
In Denmark, the 1982 change in government initiated the transition of the wage bargaining
system. The newly elected centre-right coalition cancelled the indexation of wages - and
most social transfers - to the development of the inflation rate and additionally imple-
mented far reaching stabilisation policies. The trade unions vehemently opposed this policy
and in 1985, conflicts in the labour market escalated (Due et al. 1994: 194). The govern-
ment formulated wage ceilings around 2% annual wage increases (Andersen/Risager 1990:
169), in fact, wages grew between 1984 and 1988 between 4% and 9% annually.9 Behind
this development, local wage drift accounted for the major part of the wage rise. Partly as a
consequence, the Danish employers’ , organisation reformed its internal structure. The em-
ployers in the export oriented sector centralised their organisation and restored their domi-
nance in the central employers’ organisation (DA). At the same time, these employers were
successful in decentralising the wage bargaining system. Since the late 1980s, bargaining
rounds on the central level only fix minimum wages, whereas the effective wage has been
regulated at sectoral levels. Because of the internal co-ordination in the employers’ organi-
sation, wage drift declined and in consequence, the wage growth after 1988 gradually de-
creased. In fact, the process of „Centralised Decentralisation“ (Due et al. 1994) has been
accepted by the trade unions and this generated moderate wage bargaining outcomes in the
1990s.
                                                  
8 For an overview of the recent trends in the Nordic wage bargaining systems see for example: Ahlén
1989; Due et al. 1994; Dølvik et al. 1997; Elvander 1988; Fulcher 1991, 1994; Iversen 1996a,
1996b; Kauppinen 1994; Lange/Wallerstein/Golden 1995; Pestoff 1995; Traxler 1995; Waller-
stein/Golden 1997.
9 Figures for wage growth are taken from SAF 1996; cf. figure 2, below.
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In contrast, in Finland the wage bargaining system had been highly centralised until 1987.
This had been backed by the various governments through highly formalised tri-partite
package deals. However, even in Finland, local wage drift accounted for up to 50% of the
total wage growth (Eriksson/Suvanto/Vartia 1990: 200; Tyrvainen 1995: 170) and the an-
nual growth rate in wages was around 6% and 10% between 1984 and 1989. The conserva-
tive - social democratic coalition government, however, initiated a deregulation of the wage
bargaining system. The conservative party claimed that wage formation should follow the
incentives of the market and therefore should be handled on a local level. As a conse-
quence, wage drift increased even more. In the aftermath of the economic crisis since 1990
the governments and labour market organisations have been able to rebuild the Finnish
wage bargaining system. The employers in the export oriented manufacturing industries
started to decentralise wage bargaining in 1993. In the mid 1990s, wage bargaining in Fin-
land was located at the local and sectoral level, however, as in the Danish case, there is high
co-ordination amongst the employers, leading to low wage drift and moderate wage in-
creases.
In Norway, the newly elected centre-right coalition of 1981 stopped the hitherto active role
of the government in the wage bargaining process. As a consequence, wage drift skyrocked
in the 1980s, and amounted to up to 66% (Elvander 1990: 9) or even 90% (Hernes 1991:
253) of the total wage sum. Total wages grew very fast, reaching their highest level in 1986
with an annual wage increase of 16%. In contrast, the new incumbent social democratic
party launched an „emergency incomes policy“ (Mjøset 1989: 334), starting with moral
persuasion in 1987 and progressing to a wage law in 1988, which fixed wage agreements
for the whole economy. As a consequence, wage growth began to decline. This was backed
up by several attempts of the new government to rebuild the consensual policy formation
process. An encompassing „solidarity programme“ (cf. Dølvik et al. 1997: 91-94; NOU
1992) was achieved, in which an active incomes policy and further spending on education
and training has been promised by the government in order to promote consensual labour
relations and moderate wage growth.10 Furthermore, a new committee was established
(„Forum for the Creation of Values“), which excluded participants from the white collar
unions (Mjøset et al. 1994: 71). All these measures have  been implemented in order to
rebuild the co-ordinated wage bargaining process, up to 1997 with significant success.
                                                  
10 In the 1990s, the governments intervened frequently by law in order to stabilise wage bargaining and
to prevent a break away of single trade unions - mainly from the public sector or white collar unions
- from the central agreements (cf. Die Zeit 9th May 1997, p. 26). It remains to be seen, if the newly
elected bourgeois government will follow this policy. At the time of writing, some white collar un-
ions have announced their unwillingness to follow the guiding lines of the main labour market or-
ganisations and the government (cf.:<http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/okonomi/ d30943.htm>.
January 1998).
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Lastly, in Sweden, the social democratic government launched the policy of the third way in
1982 (cf. Feldt 1991), which relied heavily on moderate wage growth and started with a
huge devaluation.11 The centralised wage bargaining process had already collapsed in
1983, as the employers in the manufacturing industry broke away and conducted a sectoral
collective agreement. In 1985, the government stepped back in its attempts to co-ordinate
the wage bargaining process, which opened the leeway for accelerating conflicts and a fur-
ther fragmentation of the bargaining process (Ahlén 1989; Kjellberg 1992). In the remain-
ing 1980s, wage competition between the private and the public sector accelerated, wage
drift accounted for up to 50% and the total wage development rose between 1986 and 1989
from 7% up to 10% annual wage growth. In the early 1990s, decentralisation was in prog-
ress, the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF) dissolved its wage bargaining unit and im-
plemented its withdrawal from the national corporatistic institutions (Pontusson/Swenson
1996). However, wage drift is nevertheless high (OECD 1995f: 17-19) and despite the most
serious economic crisis since the 1930s total wage growth has remained comparatively high
and wage competition between the public and private sector is still very pronounced.
As has been shown, the Nordic Countries followed different pathways. On the one hand, in
Denmark and Finland, we can observe a pattern that can be labelled „Centralised Decen-
tralisation“ (Due et al. 1994) or as Traxler (1995) put it, „Organised Decentralisation“. This
strategy implies moderate wage increases and a co-ordinated policy concertation between
governments and the actors of capital and labour. And this strategy rests on the capacity of
the employers’ organisations to enhance their internal co-ordination. On the other hand, in
Norway a further centralisation of the bargaining process took place, which has been de-
pendent on the willingness of the government to intervene by law. Finally, in Sweden there
has been no co-ordinated wage bargaining process. The decentralisation strategy of the SAF
was successful, but wage growth is still comparatively high and the institutions of the pol-
icy co-ordination have broken away. From this overview of the developments, two ques-
tions arise: Firstly, what have been the consequences of the eroding wage bargaining sys-
tems for employment? Secondly, what are the reasons behind the different pathways in the
Nordic Countries?
Is there a relationship between wage growth and employment? Therborn (1985, 1987) as
well as Korpi (1991) argue that the influence of wage growth upon the development of em-
ployment is not straightforward, and in the best case holds true for only a few countries and
only from time to time. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth seems to have a
significant reverse relationship with employment (cf. Figure 2).
                                                  
11 This political strategy started from the assumption „first growth and then redistribution“ (Pontusson
1992b: 314). Profits should be allowed to rise in order to stimulate investment, hence, wage growth
should remain at a very low level.
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Figure 2: Percentage Growth of Wages and the Development of the Employment Rates,
1984 - 1994
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As can be seen from figure 2, wage increases in the mid-1980s were exceptionally high in
Norway, Finland, and Sweden, whereas Denmark remains in this respect in the middle field
(partly because the transformation of the wage bargaining system had already started there
in the early 1980s). And in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth indeed has an inverse rela-
tionship with employment.12 Therefore, we can argue that the erosion of the Nordic wage
bargaining systems in the 1980s has been the main cause of the employment crisis and,
hence, the transformation of the central cornerstone of the Social Democratic Full Em-
ployment Model.
Why could the Nordic wage bargaining systems no longer produce moderate wage growth
in the 1980s? And what are the reasons behind the different developments in the 1990s?
Firstly, in all four countries, wage competition between the public and private sector pre-
vailed in the 1980s, and labour market conflicts increased, and to a great extent they were
induced by the actors in the public sector. This was one consequence of the expansion of
the welfare state and the far reaching bargaining rights of the public employees in the Nor-
dic Countries. Secondly, the employers in the private sector were very opposed to this wage
competition and tried to decentralise the wage bargaining process and to reduce the wage
costs as well as the supplementary wage costs, i.e. social insurance expenditures. In Swe-
den, the SAF broke the corporatistic compromise and withdraw itself from these tri-partite
bodies of policy formation and implementation. In the other countries - except Denmark -
                                                  
12 In the 1980s and 1990s, there have been no policy instruments available to dampen the impact of
wage growth - as for example devaluations - or their further use has been limited - as for example
the further growth of public employment. For a very instructive examination of the political condi-
tions of wage restraint and its impact on economic performance, cf. Traxler/Kittel (1997).
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the employers announced such measures in the 1980s, too. The employers’ federation in
Norway (NHO) repeatedly proclaimed such measures in the late 1980s, the Finnish em-
ployers’ federation (TT) did the same, and they were rather reluctant to co-operate on a
prolonged basis (cf. Mjøset 1996; Milner 1994: 178). However, in these countries - as well
as in Denmark, co-operation could be renewed - why? One explanation focuses on the vari-
ous governmental measures undertaken to fulfil the claims of employers, such as a further
expansion of education or an activistic incomes policy as in Norway. A second - and deci-
sive - condition however is based on the relief from social security contributions granted to
the employers. As is shown in table 1, the financial burden of the employers in funding the
welfare state has been very small in Denmark or has been significantly reduced in Finland
and Norway. And this stands in clear contrast to the development in Sweden.
Table 1: Funding the Nordic Welfare States, 1981 - 1993
public share
(%)
employers’
share (%)
employees’
share (%)
Denmark
1981 88 10 2
1984 85 11 4
1987 84 11 5
1990 86 8 6
1994 80 10 11
Finland
1981 44 48 8
1984 49 44 7
1987 47 44 9
1990 46 46 9
1994 49 36 15
Norway
1978 37 44 19
1981 42 38 20
1984 46 35 19
1987 51 31 18
1990 55 28 16
1994 66 22 14
Sweden
1981 50 49 1
1984 51 48 1
1987 55 44 1
1990 52 45 3
1993 55 44 1
Source: NOSOSCO, various issues (in the source the sum of digits of the
numbers has not been 100 for all years).
As can be seen from table 1, the funding system in Denmark relies to a very great extent
upon taxes (albeit the increase of the employer’s share in 1994, which was caused by the
labour market reform). In Finland, the employer’s share decreased sharply after 1990, and
the current government announced its goal to reduce this ratio further (MISEP 1997: 11). In
Norway, the social democratic government has since 1986 gradually reduced the em-
ployer’s share, thereby fulfilling one goal of the NHO. Hence, the evidence suggests that
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behind the institutional development lay the employers material interests, and these inter-
ests should we take seriously if we want to explain institutional developments (Pontusson
1996).
Hence, the evidence shows that a co-ordinated wage bargaining process and a co-ordinated
corporatistic policy formation in a world of globalised capital rests on the willingness of the
political actors of the labour movement to relief the employers of the costs of the welfare
state and to back this by moderate wage growth.13 Exactly this did not occur in Sweden.
Therefore, this papers argument is that the lack of financial relief for the employers caused
or at least induced the break down of the corporatistic institutions in Sweden (Lewin 1992,
1994; Jahn 1994; more optimistic: Rothstein 1994), and the conflicts in the wage bargain-
ing process in this country (cf. Pestoff 1995; SAF 1997: 34-47). Hence, this internal policy
paved the way for the employment crisis in Sweden, not globalisation.
In conclusion, we have to emphasise the partly diverging pathways of the Nordic Countries
in their efforts to stimulate employment. The argument put forward is that the employment
crises have not been caused by external developments - the economic crises or gloabalisa-
tion. Rather that the external conditions narrowed the leeway for the political actors to react
to the loss of competitiveness in the domestic export industries, which in turn has its roots
in domestic developments. The erosion of the wage bargaining systems, accelerating con-
flicts on the labour markets, and the from a comparative point of view high wage growth
caused shrinking employment in the Nordic Countries.14 Therefore, the central cornerstone
of the Nordic Full Employment Model was eroded in the 1980s in all four countries, but in
the 1990s, the Nordic Countries followed different ways out of the crises. In Denmark and
Finland, an „organized decentralisation“ (Traxler 1995) took place, whereas in Norway the
wage bargaining system has been further centralised. These reforms have been initiated or
requested by the national employers’ organisations. In Sweden, such quiescence could not
be sustained. There, the employers’ federation broke the corporatistic consensus. This di-
vorce in the Scandinavian „Family of Nations“ (Castles 1993) can be explained by crucial
reform steps which included moderate wage growth and a relief of the employers from the
costs of the welfare states, which was blocked only in Sweden. In the other Nordic Coun-
                                                  
13 This argument is supported by the development in the Netherlands. The compromise of Wassenaar
in 1982 was based to a very great extent on the promise to reduce the social security contributions of
the employers. A compromise that has been fulfilled during the 1980s and paved the way for large
scale working time reductions. For a discussion of the impact of social security contributions on em-
ployment in Continental Europe, cf. Scharpf (1997).
14 Note that the erosion of the wage bargaining systems occurred already in the 1980s. Hence, we can
reject the argument that the co-ordinated wage bargaining process was a „good weather syndrome“
(Lewin 1992, 1994), which collapsed as a result of the economic crises in the early 1990s. Quite the
contrary, in economically prosperous times, the erosion of the wage bargaining systems took place
and this paved the way to the employment crisis some years later.
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tries, the transition in this dimension of the Full Employment Model seems to have been
successful.
2.2 The Politics of Labour Market Integration
The main goal of the Nordic Full Employment Model has been not only to minimise unem-
ployment but even to maximise the integration of the population into the labour market. As
already noted above, in the early 1990s, this trend came to a halt, and the pathways of the
Nordic Countries diverged. Table 2 reveals the development in the participation rates for
the younger workforce, the older workforce, and the female participation rate.
As can be seen, the decline of the participation rate for the younger workforce was from a
comparative point of view exceptionally great in Sweden, Finland and Norway, whereas the
development in Denmark is at the average level for all OECD countries. The older work-
force remained in contrast in Denmark, Finland and Sweden on the labour market, but they
left it to a very great extent in Norway. Lastly, female participation rates declined in all
Nordic Countries but Denmark, contrary to the trend in the OECD-area. Hence, the reduc-
tion in the labour force supply15 is a new phenomenon in the Nordic Countries which not
only reduced open unemployment in the early 1990s, but demands an explanation.
Table 2: The Development of the Labour Supply in the Nordic Countries, 1988 - 1994
Participation Rate of
the Younger Workforce
Participation Rate of
the Older Workforce
Participation Rate of
the Females
Denmark -6,65 -0,75 0,70
Finland -13,50 0,60 -3,20
Norway -11,50 -2,40 -1,50
Sweden -17,80 -0,10 -5,50
OECD Average -6,48 -0,68 2,48
Note: The figures are percentage point differences.
Source: OECD 1994b, 1996a.
The transition from school to work
 is a rather complex relationship. The main instrument
used to reduce the participation rate of the younger workforce is to expand higher educa-
tion. And in the Nordic Countries, governments relied heavily on this policy instrument. In
Norway, the Brundtland government decided in 1986 to expand tertiary education, and this
                                                  
15 Between 1988 and 1994, total labour force participation declined in Sweden by -6.0 percentage
points, in Finland by -3.4, and Norway by -3.2. In the OECD-area only Luxembourg experienced a
similar decline (-5.6 percentage points). In Denmark the decline was rather modest (-0.7 percentage
points), whereas the average for all OECD countries reveals overall continuity (cf. Jochem 1997:
175).
18
strategy has been further strengthened with the „Solidarity Programme“ of 1992 (cf. Dølvik
et al. 1997: 91-94; NOU 1992), which is based on an encompassing consent between the
main parties and labour market organisations. As a consequence the growth rate of student
places at universities was at approximately 45% between 1984 and 1994, a development
which was only higher in Portugal in the OECD - a trend which will endure, as the latest
projections of the OECD reveal (OECD 1997b: 121).
In Finland, a similar development took place. In the early 1990s, the centre-right coalition
strengthened - despite the economic turmoil - its efforts to expand higher education. In this
country, the growth rate in the period mentioned was about 30%, with as a consequence
declining labour force participation rates. In Denmark, the expansion of higher education
was rather modest, as was the decline of the participation rate, too. However, in 1993, the
government announced a strategy to strengthen the educational system. The so called UTA-
programme (Uddannelse Til Alle; Education for All), aims at the youngest age groups on
the labour market. Their education shall be enhanced through a variety of institutions and
programs in the field of the higher secondary education (Undervisningsministeriet 1995:86
f.). Higher education at the universities has grown in the 1980s and 1990s, too. Between
1985 and 1995, the figure for enrolled students grew by 79 %. The governments not only
expanded universities directly, they further broadened the grant system, leading to one of
the most fully developed grant systems in the OECD-area, in which roughly 70 % of all
students receive loans (OECD 1997a:88).16
Sweden has been a somehow deviant case. Here, the participation rate of the younger
workforce dropped rapidly in the early 1990s but the figures for the students remained
rather stable. Behind this empirical puzzle, the specific structure of the Swedish education
system has to be considered. In this country, higher education has been to a very large ex-
tent provided by ‘folkhögskolor’ (folk high schools). Blanchflower/Freeman (1996: 24) for
example show that at the beginning of the 1990s, around 73% of 20 year old persons in the
USA received their higher education at universities, whereas the rate for Sweden was only
36%. Hence, the sharp decline in the participation rate may have its origin in the openness
of the folk high schools.17 But the newly elected social democratic government changed the
educational policy in 1994. It was announced that the universities should expand. As a con-
sequence, the figure for the students increased sharply thereafter (OECD 1995f: 81).
                                                  
16 A further strategy in Denmark was connected with the encompassing labour market policy reform in
1994. The government invented the system of adult education and training of the employed and un-
employed. This ‘life-long learning’ strategy is further described below (chapter 2.3).
17 A further specificity is the statistical treatment of the younger persons being enrolled in active labour
market policy schemes: They are counted as being not on the labour market, which implies that the
participation rate declines (Elmeskov 1994: 44).
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Taken together, all four countries - albeit at different points in time - expanded their educa-
tional efforts. This policy change has been induced by governments of the left as well as by
bourgeois governments as in Denmark or by broad coalitions as in Finland. Hence, the
question remains what the political causes of this policy change in the Nordic Model might
be. Firstly, the political institutional preconditions for this policy change were favourable in
the Nordic Countries. Education policies could be fully implemented by the central gov-
ernment. In the process of decision making and implementation, no veto players could hin-
der this policy change. Secondly, the youth already played a prominent role in the Nordic
labour market policies in the 1980s. In 1984, the Swedish government had already imple-
mented a job guarantee of further education for the younger workforce, and the other Nor-
dic governments followed suite - the laggard was Denmark in 1993 (Lind: 1994a: 189).
Gradually, the emphasis changed from training on the job towards higher education at uni-
versities. Esping-Andersen (1996a: 14) calls this development a „social investment strat-
egy“ which helps to strengthen the chances of the younger age groups of becoming em-
ployed in a mediate time perspective. However, this strategy directly reduced the labour
supply and as a consequence dampened open unemployment in the early 1990s.
The integration of the older workforce was exceptionally high in the Nordic Countries until
the late 1980s (cf. Wadensjö 1994).18 In the early 1990s, the participation rates of the older
workforce remained rather stable on a high level in Denmark and Sweden and increased
from a comparatively modest level in Finland. In Norway in contrast, the participation rate
declined by 2.4 percentage points between 1988 and 1994.19 Hence, the developments in
the Nordic Countries differed in this respect, but why?
The Social Democratic Welfare States - so it is argued - would supply several instruments
for early retirement schemes. The political actors, however, would prefer to achieve a
maximisation of labour market integration (cf. Aust/Bieling 1996; Esping-Andersen 1990:
150-153; von Rhein-Kress 1996: 55-69). At least in Denmark and Sweden, this institutional
explanation holds even in the 1990s. In Denmark, the share of early retirees remained rather
stable on a comparatively low level. In Sweden, the share increased somewhat, but espe-
cially in the age group of the 60 to 65 year old persons.20 On the other hand, in Finland,
several early retirement schemes existed until the late 1980s. The earliest age to draw on
these schemes was 55 years until 1989, this was then gradually restricted from 55 to 60
(OECD 1995c: 60, 84). As a consequence, the proportion of persons drawing on early re-
tirement schemes between the age of 50 and 59 declined between 1990 and 1993. Finally,
the pension reform in Finland - gradually implemented between 1993 and 1996 - aimed at
                                                  
18 In this respect, Finland is a somehow deviant case. Here, already in the 1970s and 1980s a huge part
of the older labour force left the labour market, which was induced by several early retirement pro-
grams.
19 In comparison, the participation rate in the OECD-area declined modestly by -0.7 percentage points.
20 The reported data refer to NOSOSCO (various issues).
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promoting longer working careers through a wide array of instruments which reduced the
incentives for early retirement (cf. OECD 1997c:67-91).21 Hence, early retirement is no
longer promoted through the institutions of the Finish pension system, the aim is to promote
long working careers.
In Norway, development followed a different pathway. In this country the participation rate
of the older workforce dropped significantly. Indeed, there evolves an empirical puzzle. The
possibilities for early retirement in this country are restricted and the political goal of the
various governments has been to promote long lasting working careers. In Norway the re-
tirement age is comparatively high (67 years), and even the possibility to draw on early
retirement schemes is first possible at the age of 66 or 65, and the transfers in theses pro-
grams are rather low. The exit from the labour market has therefore occurred since the mid
1980s mainly through the invalidity schemes. Indeed, the amount of invalidity pensioners
increased to a large extent in Norway between 1980 (ca. 160 thousands) and  1991 (ca. 240
thousands) (NOU 1992: 223). In 1993, this development was further strengthened through
the tightening of the anticipatory pension schemes, which led as a consequence to a rising
demand for invalidity pensions (NOSOSCO 1995: 14). And despite some restrictions in the
field of disability pensions the trend seems to be unbroken until the mid 1990s. Norway is
now at the top of the OECD countries in term of high levels of disability pensions. And
„more than 40% of people over 55 use disability benefits as a bridge to retirement“ (OECD
1997b: 77). These factors combined caused the declining participation rates of the older
workforce in Norway, despite institutional incentives to stay up to the age of 65 on the la-
bour market.22
The integration of females into the labour market was one cornerstone of the Scandinavian
and Social Democratic Full Employment Model (cf. Schmidt 1993a; Siaroff 1994; von
Rhein-Kress 1996: 80-101). However, in the early 1990s, the female participation rate
dropped to a very large extent in Sweden (-5.5 percentage points between 1988 and 1994),
Finland (-3.2) and Norway (-1.5), whereas the rate could be slightly increased in Denmark
by 0.7 percentage points, but even here the female participation rate decreased after 1994.
In this respect, the three Nordic countries diverge from the common trend in the OECD,
where the participation rate for females went up by 2.5 percentage points. What are the
reasons behind this change within the Model?
                                                  
21 Indeed, the Finish pension reform is „exceptional among the OECD countries“ (OECD 1997c: 80),
because the funding method changed (employees contribute since 1993 to the pension system) and
the universal flat-rate pension will gradually be abolished. Interestingly, this reform was based on a
far reaching consensus between the political parties, employer organisations and unions (OECD
1997c: 67).
22 The rising distribution of private and occupational pension plans in Norway and throughout Scandi-
navia (cf. Kangas/Palme 1989; Overbye 1996) may have also caused the rising trend towards early
withdrawal from the labour market. As Castles shows (1996) for Australia, the decision to retire
early is determined not only by institutions and policies of the pension system.
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One way to explain this development refers to the reduction of public employment in the
Nordic Countries. In response to the economic crises in the early 1990s, the governments in
Sweden and Finland changed the construction of financial transfers to local government,
which provide most of the social services - and where the greatest proportion of women is
employed. In both countries public employment dropped in the early 1990s. And this would
explain perfectly the development in these countries, but for the fact that Norway further
expanded public employment and despite that the female participation rate declined there,
too. Yet another hypothesis can be excluded. The Nordic governments still promoted public
child care institutions in the 1980s and 1990s, at least if the share of children in day care
institutions is examined.23 Therefore, we can assume that the policies mentioned do not
contribute to an explanation for the shrinking female participation rate.
The main cause of the changing participation behaviour of females can be found in the de-
velopment of part-time employment. In this respect, in Denmark and Norway, the percent-
age of people in part-time employment declined in the 1980s and early 1990s, whereas it
stagnated in Sweden and Finland. As comparative analyses show, the development of part-
time employment is not only one strategy to overcome the European employment crises - as
it happened in the Netherlands (Hannemann 1997; Schmid 1996) - it is also one major
pathway to enhance female labour market participation (Schmidt 1993a: 43; von Rhein-
Kress 1996: 91). But why did part-time work in the Nordic Countries stagnate? To answer
this question, we have to be aware that there are several ways to promote part-time work
(Maier 1994). In Scandinavia, the further expansion of the public sector has been blocked,
or the expansion occurred on a rather low scale as in Norway and Denmark. The expansion
of part-time work in the private sector seems to depend on the degree to which the labour
market organisations can agree to compromise on a concerted strategy (cf. Walwei/Werner
1995). In this respect, only in Denmark has such a strategy been implemented through the
labour market reform in 1994. There, the aim has been there to share life long working
time. As a consequence, females joining the rotation programmes24 leave - in a statistical
sense - the labour market.
To sum up, labour force supply declined in all four countries in the early 1990s. The transi-
tion from school to work for the younger workforce was delayed because of a common
strategy intended to promote higher education in the Nordic Countries. This may be one
piece of a „social investment strategy“ (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 14), helping to enhance
                                                  
23 This statement is based on data reported in NOSOSCO (various issues) (cf. Jochem 1997: 199-200).
24 There are three rotation programs available: for further education, for child caring, or without any
special reason (‘sabbaticals’). These rotation programs last one year and are benefited with 80% of
the previous wage, since 1997 60% of the previous wage. Especially women do demand to a great
extent the child caring programme (cf. Lind 1994; Loftager/Madsen 1997; Madsen 1996).
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labour market performance in the middle run.25 In contrast, the older workforce remained
on the labour market, except in Norway. Here, the common strategy of the labour market
organisations combined with the leeway of the invalidity pension system facilitated a clear
decline in the participation rate. Finally, even females contributed to the decline of the la-
bour force supply. Far from witnessing a „De-Feminization of the Labour Force“ (following
Jenson/Hagen/Reddy 1988), we can state, that an increasing proportion of women leave the
labour market or do not re-enter it in the Nordic Countries, which can partly be explained
by the blocked growth of part-time employment in the private sector. Hence, with the re-
ported development of labour market participation, we can argue that one prominent di-
mension of the Social Democratic Full Employment Model withered away. No longer is it a
prominent goal to maximise labour market participation. In contrast, even in the Nordic
Countries, labour supply has become one policy instrument to counteract unemployment
(cf. von Rhein-Kress 1996). Hence, in this respect, the Nordic Model has converged to-
wards the ‘conservative’ model in continental Europe.
2.3 The Politics of Labour Market Policy
Active labour market policy has been one cornerstone in the social democratic strategy to
regulate the matching process on the labour market (cf. Hedborg/Meidner 1984: 125-139;
Elvander 1994: 304). Or as the Swedish economists Rehn and Meidner mentioned already
in the 1940s, active labour market policy is a prominent „social democratic strategy to keep
inflation under control while pursuing full employment“ (cited after Janoski 1996: 698). On
the other hand, passive labour market measures have also been comprehensively developed
in the Nordic Countries. This two fold strategy - to secure the unemployed and to help the
unemployed back to work - is indeed one major characteristic of the Social Democratic Full
Employment Model. The aim of this chapter is to examine if labour market policies
changed in the 1980s and 1990s and to explain the development.
In the Nordic Countries, passive labour market policies have been, from a comparative
point of view, very generous (cf. OECD 1994, Part II: 171-192). Since the early 1970s, the
transfers have been upgraded, and especially in Denmark, the replacement rate is from a
comparative point of view exceptionally high. Furthermore, in Denmark, in contrast to the
other Nordic Countries, there are no waiting periods, but since 1989 employers have had to
                                                  
25 To evaluate this strategy is first possible, when the students leave higher education institutions and
try to enter the labour market. First evidence for Finland (Vuorinen 1995: 36) shows that this policy
is far from being a bridge but rather a trap, because the demand for highly educated employees is
still too low.
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finance the first day of unemployment, since 1993 the first two days.26 In 1994, the encom-
passing labour market reform changed the method of funding, since then, the employers
and the employees have to share the total costs of labour market policy. Additionally, the
total duration of benefits has been limited to up to seven, and since 1996 to five years,
which blocked the facility to renew unemployment benefits by leap-frogging to active la-
bour market policy measures. In Denmark, the first two years of the period is called the
‘benefit period’, and the last three years the ‘active period’. In the latter period, the unem-
ployed person has the duty - or right - to participate in activities which shall improve his
chances on the labour market (cf. Hatland 1998).
In Norway, passive labour market policy remained generous and unlimited until 1996.
Then, the social democratic government passed a bill which limited the combined duration
of unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. Furthermore, the unemployed
person is permitted to refuse only up to three job offers without loosing the right to benefits
(OECD 1997b:78). This has been the only restrictive measure in this policy field in the
1990s. And the director of the Norwegian Labour Market Board, Ted Hanisch, stated
clearly, that the Norwegian passive labour market policy is „very generous, but also very
rigorous“ (FAZ, 19.12.1997, p. 20; my translation)
In Finland, passive labour market policy is not as generous as in the other Nordic Countries.
In the early 1990s, waiting periods were introduced and the duration of the benefits were
reduced to 500 days in four years in 1994. Thereafter, the unemployed person has to refer to
a social assistance scheme, which is called ‘Labour Market Support’ and there means test-
ing is applied (OECD 1995c: 56-58). This has indeed caused a significant reduction of
benefits for long term unemployed, who had to accept a sharp decline in their living condi-
tions.
In Sweden, finally, the role of the passive labour market policy has been a prior point in
party competition. The centre-right government introduced five waiting days in 1993 and -
with the consent of the social democratic party - reduced the wage replacement rate from
90% to 70%. Furthermore, the government tried to limit the duration of benefits and to in-
troduce an obligatory insurance system which consequently would have changed the previ-
ous system in which the trade unions steered the voluntary unemployment insurance insti-
tutions. However, the social democratic government abolished these reforms, following
protest from the trade unions (OECD 1995f: 22). In March 1997, the incumbent social
democratic party implemented their promise made during the last electoral campaign, in-
creasing the replacement rate from 70% to 80%. Hence, even in Sweden, there is no univer-
                                                  
26 With these reforms, the Danish governments tried to circumvent a typically Danish situation, where
employers prefer to dismiss employees and reemploy them after a short time. At least in this respect,
the policy measures have been successful (Velstand og Velfærd 1995: 436).
24
sal trend towards reductions, but a fierce partisan conflict about the institutional setting and
design of passive labour market policies.
The Nordic Countries expanded their active labour market policies in the 1990s. Despite
financial constraints the increase in spending on active labour market measures has been
from a comparative point of view exceptionally high. No other OECD country expanded
active labour market policies in the early 1990s in a such an impressive way as the Nordic
Countries.27 This expansion occurred under social democratic as well as under govern-
ments of the right. And the policy of the centre right government in Sweden has been
„Thatcherism plus a dose of Swedish labour market policy“ (Calmfors 1993: 54) - albeit a
huge dose. How can we explain this continuity despite the financial constraints and the
criticism of this policy by some economists?28
Comparative analyses show that there is no common trend towards increasing efforts on
active labour market policies (Armingeon 1997: 15-16). The prominent role of this policy
can be traced back to the firm position of the labour market boards in the Nordic Countries
(cf. Janoski 1996). These corporatistic bodies have huge leeway for policy implementation
and the funding method rests on taxation rather than on social security contributions (cf.
Reissert/Schmid 1996). This indeed widened the leeway to invest in this policy. But despite
this institutionalist explanation, it has to be emphasised that most political actors in Scandi-
navia do prefer active labour market policies instead of a passive contribution of benefits.
Therefore, behind the ‘skill’ of the labour market institutions, the political ‘will’ beyond the
political demarcations seems crucial, if we want to explain this continuity in Scandinavia.
To sum up, labour market policy in Scandinavia has by and large been rather constant. In
the field of passive labour market policy, some restrictions took place. Especially, the facil-
ity to renew unemployment benefits by leap-frogging to active labour market policy meas-
ures has been blocked. This can be seen rather as a strengthening of the ‘work line’ in Nor-
dic labour market policy, than as a withdrawal from it. Hence, in the Nordic Countries, no
‘re-commodification of the workforce’ through globalisation (Neyer/Seeleib-Kaiser 1995)
took place. Security for the unemployed persons is from a comparative point of view still
generous, and the activistic policy stance has been strengthened rather than diminished. We
can explain the perpetuation of this dimension of the Nordic Model through the prominent
role of the labour market institutions and the political will of the decisive political actors.
                                                  
27 Between 1988 and 1994, the expenditures for active labour market policies as a ratio of gdp ex-
panded in Sweden by +1.2 percentage points, in Norway by + 1.1, in Finland and Denmark by 0.6.
The OECD average is +0.22 percentage points (data refer to OECD Employment Outlook, various
issues).
28 In the early 1990s, criticism of active labour market policy gained momentum. Especially Calmfors
(1994) criticised the negative effects of this policy on the wage bargaining process and labour mar-
ket segregation. Forslund/Krueger (1995: 139) criticise the low efficiency, and they argue that in
Sweden one year in active labour market policy measures is as expansive as one year at Harvard.
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But especially in Sweden, partisan conflict about the institutional setting of the labour mar-
ket policy has increased in recent years.29
3 Conclusion: The Politics of Transforming the Social Democratic
Full Employment Model
The Social Democratic Full Employment Model in Scandinavia is in transition. It has been
shown in this paper that some dimensions of the model have changed whereas others have
remained fairly stable. Hence, due to the disentangled analysis, we could locate change as
well as continuity30, and the results are summarised in figure 3.
Figure 3: The Transition of the Social Democratic Full Employment Model in the 1980s
and 1990s
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Demand-
side
Deteriorating wage
bargaining system in
the 1980s but reorgani-
sation in the 1990s.
No negative impact
from the funding sys-
tem of the welfare state
Deteriorating wage
bargaining system in
the late 1980s. Re-
building the consensus
through relief of em-
ployers from the costs
of the welfare state
Deteriorating wage
bargaining systems in
the 1980s. Interven-
tionist incomes poli-
cies, relief of employ-
ers from the costs of
the welfare state
Deteriorating wage
bargaining systems in
the 1980s. No relief for
employers from the
costs of the welfare
state. No consensual
approach in wage
bargaining
Supply-
side
High labour force
participation rate.
Sharp decline after the
labour market reform
1994
Modest decline of
labour force participa-
tion. Attempts to sta-
bilise labour force
supply after 1993
Significant decline
despite public meas-
ures to stabilise labour
force supply
Significant decline
Matching
-process
Intensive use of active
labour market policies.
Minor cut backs of
passive labour market
policies
Intensive use of active
labour market policies.
Moderate reduction of
passive measures
Very intensive use of
labour market policies.
Minor cut backs of
passive labour market
policies
Very intensive use of
labour market policies.
Moderate cut backs of
passive labour market
policies
The politics of stimulating employment changed in all four countries in the 1980s. The
wage bargaining systems eroded, wage growth increased very sharply and this led to the
Nordic employment crisis in the early 1990s - not globalisation or the severity of economic
                                                  
29 One further step has been taken by the Swedish Employers Federation, which in the 1990s is trying
to radically de-institutionalise the labour market - in order to assimilate the Swedish labour market
towards the labour market constitution of the USA. A strategy which includes the claim to abolish
the Swedish labour market board (SAF 1997).
30 Hence, we can recast the critic of Notermans (1993: 135) who argues that the „comparative focus
stands in the way of discerning cross-national similarities in political dynamics“. Rather it is a matter
of conscious use of methods.
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crises.31 But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in Denmark, Norway and Finland, a new
modus vivendi could be achieved, with moderate wage growth and rising employment in
the mid 1990s. In contrast, in Sweden this way seems to be blocked. Why this is the case
has to be discussed in detail below. On the supply side of the labour market, in all four
countries the participation rate declined in the early 1990s. Hence, the Nordic ‘Work So-
cieties’ changed, and labour force supply has become in the Nordic Countries - as in the
conservative welfare states in continental Europe (cf. von Rhein-Kress 1996) - a policy
instrument to combat unemployment. Finally, in the field of labour market policies only
minor changes occurred. Passive labour market policies have been slightly restricted and
the emphasis of the ‘working line’ has been strengthened. Active labour market policies
were extensively used in the early 90s and the status of the corporatistic labour market
boards remained stable, except in Sweden. Hence, a „re-commodification of the labour
force“ (Neyer/Seeleib-Kaiser 1995) cannot be observed in Scandinavia. From a compara-
tive point of view, the reductions have been modest, and as Hatland put it (1998: 10): „we
are struck by how effective the resistance against cuts in levels has been“.The analysis of
the Scandinavian Full Employment Model has shown that globalisation has not been the
„death knell of social democracy“ (Garrett 1995:682), and in contrast to Notermans (1993:
135) it is argued in this paper that labour as an equal partner in macro economic decision
making is no hindrance but a conditio sine qua non for adequate policy implementation and
hence success on the labour market - at least in organised economies as in Scandinavia.
Hence, the argument of this paper follows Armingeon (1996: 2), who states that „(i)nstead
of being a restriction, globalisation is a chance for the left“. But making use of this chance,
depends on political conditions, to which we now turn.
As Scharpf already mentioned in 1987, the „main burden of the welfare state has to be
shouldered by the employees“ (Scharpf 1987: 333, my translation). In a world of globalised
capital, the employers have the choice of investing abroad and the national institutions of
policy making are no longer the main focus of influence. To assure the co-operation of the
employers, unions have to pursue moderate wage policies and governments have to relieve
the employers of the costs of the welfare state. This at least is the lesson from the Scandina-
vian countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In Norway and - as a laggard - in Finland, govern-
ments have changed the funding systems of the welfare states thereby cutting the share paid
by the employers. In Denmark, the employers’ share was already very low in the 1980s.32
In Sweden, the bourgeois as well as the social democratic governments did not change the
funding system of the welfare state, but relied on overall cut backs to dampen social expen-
                                                  
31 Globalisation has not been the cause of the employment crises, rather globalisation narrowed the
leeway to react to diminishing competitiveness, which in turn has its origin in domestic circum-
stances. The leeway to use devaluations or to inflate a country out of employment crises has clearly
narrowed through the changing constitution of the financial markets and European integration.
32 This could be one explanation that in Denmark - in contrast to other European countries - there has
been no „Standortdebatte“ (Scharpf 1996: 135).
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ditures. Consequently, this fuelled the opposition of the trade unions and enforced party
competition, because of this, the newly elected social democratic party reversed some
measures after the first years in government.33 This in turn fuelled the fierce opposition of
the Swedish employers and hardened the break down of the corporatistic policy process.
But is labour a victim, which has to adapt without choice? To be sure, a certain conscious-
ness about the crisis and a need to reform has to be given on the side of labour.34 However,
as the Scandinavian experiences show, there have been side-payments and gains which ease
the crucial reforms and the quiescence of labour. In Denmark, labour gained from the en-
compassing labour market reform in 1994 and did not have to oppose against harsh cut
backs in the welfare state. The same holds for Norway, where labour gained from active
labour market policies, activistic public incomes policies and the educational offensive
which lowered the pressure on the labour market. Even in Finland, where severe cut backs
occurred, these were implemented gradually. To secure compliance for the EU integration
process, for example, huge buffer fonds have been created in order to counteract negative
influences on the labour market following the integration process. Furthermore, as early as
in 1995, labour market partners agreed with the support of the government on the imple-
mentation of job sharing and sabbatical programs on a trial basis. Taken together, labour in
these countries has not been a victim but has in fact gained through several structural re-
forms. In Sweden, „everyone’s favourite example of hegemonic social democracy“
(Pontusson 1992b: 305), such a quid pro quo is not observable. Labour is still on the defen-
sive and the employers fiercely oppose co-operation and demand an encompassing deregu-
lation of the labour market. It seems as if the Swedish ‘third way’ of the early 1980s ended
as a dead end road.
                                                  
33 As Lane/Ersson (1996: 255) put it, „the institutions of the Scandinavian model express compromise
politics while at the same time the overall constitutional frame is of the Westminster type“. One
condition for compromise politics has been corporatistic relations between governments and labour
market organisations. If this condition breaks away, politics approach the pure Westminster type - as
in Sweden -, with high party competition and frequent policy changes (cf. Lindbeck 1997: 1314).
34 Interestingly, in the Netherlands as well as Denmark, this consciousness was a matter of fact in the
early 1980s, perhaps as a consequence of the in the 1970s high unemployment rates. In Finland, the
huge economic crisis may have contributed to the reform willingness of labour.
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